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Abstract
Recent work has suggested that our cognitive biases and moral psychology may pose signifi-
cant barriers to tackling climate change. Here, we report evidence that through status and group-
based social influence processes, and our moral sense of justice, it may be possible to employ
such characteristics of the human mind in efforts to engender pro-environmental action. We draw
on applied work demonstrating the efficacy of social modeling techniques in order to examine
the indirect effects of social model status and group membership (through perceptions of effi-
cacy, pro-environmental collective identity and moral judgments of how fair it is for individuals
to perform particular pro-environmental actions) on pro-environmental action tendencies. We find
evidence that high (vs. low) status models increase pro-environmental action, in part, through
making such actions seem morally fairer to undertake. This effect of high status models only
occurs when they share a meaningful ingroup membership with the target of influence. Further,
we find evidence that this conditional effect of high status models may also have a direct impact
on action tendencies. While the exact behaviors that are influenced may vary across student and
non-student samples, we argue that a focus on the “justice pathway” to action and the social-
cognitive features of models may offer a good opportunity for cognitive and behavioral scientists
to integrate insights from basic research with those stemming from more applied research
efforts.
Keywords: Social model; Status; Pro-environmental action; Fairness; Morality; Efficacy; Social
identity
Correspondence should be sent to Dr. Joseph Sweetman, Psychology, College of Life and Environmental
Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK, E-mail: j.p.sweetman@exeter.ac.uk
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
T O P S 12178 Dispatch: 19.11.15 CE: Ashokkumar
Journal Code Manuscript No. No. of pages: 26 PE: Suganya Raju
1. Introduction
The science is clear; climate change requires individual, political, and institutional
action to address it (IPCC, 2014). Applied cognitive and behavioral scientists have
focused their efforts on establishing evidence-based behavioral interventions, often com-
bining multiple interventions from different theoretical perspectives (see Osbaldiston &
Schott, 2012). Basic research has focused on identifying the perceptions, attitudes, and
judgments that predict pro-environmental motivation and action (see Bamberg & M€oser,
2007; Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1987). Recently efforts have been made to examine
how cognitive biases and the general structure of the human mind may act as barriers to
pro-environmental cognition and action (Gifford, 2011; e.g., Markowitz & Shariff, 2012).
The current research attempts to build upon all of this earlier work by examining how
evidence-based behavioral interventions can benefit from what we know about such cog-
nitive biases and barriers. More specifically, we employ psychological models of collec-
tive action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) to examine whether the social status
and group membership (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; see
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) of social models (see Bandura, 1977) influences personal and
political pro-environmental action. This approach is of key importance as it both provides
a better understanding of the psychological processes through which our best-evidenced
interventions operate and offers the potential to turn biases and barriers into constructive
aspects of pro-environmental interventions.
2. Explaining social model effects through collective action constructs
Our cognitions, motivations, and actions regarding climate change do not take place in
a social vacuum. Rather, it has long been recognized that social influence acts as a perva-
sive aspect of human affairs (see Aristotle, 2005). Indeed, social-psychological theories
take such influence to be a fundamental principle guiding the scientific understanding of
human behavior (Aronson, 2007; for example, see Cialdini, 2001). Social modeling is an
established form of social influence (Bandura, 1977) that has been employed to promote
pro-environmental behavior (e.g., Burn, 1991; Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Winett, Leckliter,
Chinn, Stahl, & Love, 1985). Indeed, meta-analytic evidence suggests that social model-
ing is one of the most effective means of promoting pro-environmental action (Osbaldis-
ton & Schott, 2012).
Little work has examined either the psychological processes through which modeling
influences pro-environmental behavior or the role that the model’s status or group mem-
bership plays. To address these questions we draw on three psychological constructs that
meta-analytic evidence suggests are central to explanations of collective action: efficacy,
injustice, and identity (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Research shows that people are more
likely to act when they perceive themselves, or their group, as having the efficacy to
improve things. In addition, moral judgments of injustice also act as a positive predictor
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of collective action. As in other areas of human affairs (see Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, &
Huo, 1997), it seems that moral concerns about what is fair and just are important in
motivating collective action. Finally, perceiving oneself as a member of a group whose
identity includes particular content and norms (e.g., environmentalist) is key to overcom-
ing barriers of self-interest that characterize collective action problems such as climate
change (St"urmer & Simon, 2004). Likewise, moral judgments of fairness, perceptions of
efficacy, and notions of identity have also been shown to be important predictors of indi-
vidual or “personal” pro-environmental behavior (Bamberg & M€oser, 2007; Hines et al.,
1987; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). As such, these three constructs are plausible candi-
dates for clarifying the psychological processes that underpin social modeling effects.
3. Potentially beneficial biases and possible psychological processes
The worst effects of climate change affect members of groups that are both spatially
and temporally distant. While discounting the interests of outgroup members (Hewstone,
Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is one key psychological barrier to pro-
environmental action (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012), such ingroup bias can be employed in
the service of pro-environmental goals by focusing on the influence exerted by ingroup
(vs. outgroup) social models. For example, research in social psychology has demon-
strated that social influence can vary as a function of group membership, with individuals
tending to be more influenced by members of their own (in) groups (Abrams, Wetherell,
Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Turner, 1991). Classic social influence effects (e.g.,
Asch, 1955; Sherif, 1936) do not occur when the source of influence is an outgroup mem-
ber (Abrams et al., 1990). As such, one might expect that ingroup social models might
prove more effective than their outgroup counterparts in influencing pro-environmental
perceptions, motivation, and action. If so, what can be a harmful bias when considering
the negative outcomes of climate change might engender pro-environmental action
through group-based social influence processes (for other pro-environmental effects of
identity processes, see Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2011).
Modeling support for collective action from other group members can lead to greater
willingness to take action through increasing perceptions of efficacy and injustice (Van
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Indeed, one of the most widely cited barriers
to pro-environmental behavior change is the perceived lack of action by others and asso-
ciated perceptions of inefficacy (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007). There-
fore, one might expect ingroup (vs. outgroup) social models to indirectly increase pro-
environmental action tendencies by increasing perceptions of collective efficacy. In addi-
tion, on moral grounds it seems that if members of one’s ingroup (vs. outgroup) are tak-
ing action then, all else being equal, it seems fairer that one should also contribute, even
in circumstances when some members of the group are not acting (Tyler & Dawes,
1993). Put simply, moral notions of what is fair and just are, to some degree, dependent
on the actions of others (Haidt, 2001). It is also possible that ingroup social models may
increase action tendencies through the perception of group norms (see Abrams et al.,
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1990), leading to increased action in line with group norms (Jetten & Spears, 1996).
Therefore, as well as acting as a barrier, we argue that ingroup bias may also offer a
potential means for engendering pro-environmental action (see also, Markowitz & Shariff,
2012).
Social status is another important feature of social cognition (Fiske et al., 2007; Insel
& Fernald, 2004). Indeed, people seem particularly accurate in perceiving their own and
others’ social status (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001). Models of social cognition
suggest that status is a marker of competence (Fiske et al., 2007). As such, one might
expect high (vs. low) status social models to have greater influence on people’s motiva-
tions and actions (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Sweetman,
Spears, Livingstone, & Manstead, 2013). In the present case, high status models may
inspire people to believe that they, and others, have the efficacy to conduct pro-environ-
mental actions and that such behavior is more normative of the group – as high status, or
leading, members tend to be perceived as more prototypical of the group (Hogg, 2001).
On the other hand, low (vs. high) status models may increase perceptions of collective
efficacy. It is possible that one’s perception of the collective efficacy to undertake pro-
environmental action may be enhanced if “even” low status people, who are perceived as
low in competence (Fiske et al., 2007), are seen as having the ability to act.
In addition, the status of models may influence moral judgments concerning the fair-
ness of performing particular pro-environmental actions. It seems that, on grounds of jus-
tice, the most disadvantaged in society should not bear a disproportionate responsibility
for tackling collective problems (Rawls, 1971). Therefore, pro-environmental actions car-
ried out by low status models may make it seem only fair that others should also take
action. On the other hand, seeing high status models do their “fair share” of action may
also make it seem fairer for one to act (see Fehr, Yam, & Dang, 2015). Taken together,
if the group membership account of social influence is correct, then one would expect
any indirect effects of the model’s social status to be enhanced when the model also
shares one’s group membership.
4. The present research
Across three experiments, we employ an established psychological model of collective
action – including perceptions of efficacy, moral judgments of fairness, and measures of
pro-environmental social identity – in order to test the indirect effects of the status and
group membership of social models on willingness to engage in pro-environmental action.
In line with the group-basis of social influence account, we test whether the indirect
effects of social model status are conditional on group membership (see Fig. 1 for a con-
ceptual model). While personal pro-environmental actions (e.g., recycling, water conser-
vation, sustainable transportation) are relatively malleable and can facilitate necessary
reductions in carbon emissions (Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009),
climate scientists have recently argued that only political action, aimed at radical institu-
tional change, can avert climate catastrophe (Anderson, 2013). Therefore, we test whether
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our psychological model can simultaneously account for willingness to engage in both
personal and political pro-environmental action.
4.1. Experiment 1: Testing for a conditional indirect effect of model status in a student
sample
4.1.1. Participants, design, and procedure
Participants were 129 British undergraduate students (117 women and 12 men; age:
M = 19.27, SD = 2.11) who received course credit for participation. Participants were
randomly allocated to one condition in a 2 (model status: high vs. low) 9 2 (model iden-
tity: ingroup vs. outgroup) between-subjects design. After being informed that the study
was examining attitudes toward climate change, participants read a fictitious news article
documenting the climate change actions undertaken by a social model. For example, in
the high status, ingroup, condition participants read that:
Recently the CBI (Confederation of British Industry—a body representing British busi-
ness) has introduced a climate change scheme whereby CEOs and other well-paid Bri-
tish business executives will pay 15% of their annual salaries to the CBI action on
climate change project. The project has received broad support from CBI members.
Importantly, this project invests in developing technologies and services (e.g., renew-
Fig. 1. 8Conceptual model: Direct and indirect effects of model (Mod.) status on willingness to take pro-
environmental (Pro-env.) action (through efficacy, fairness, and pro-environmental identity) as a function of
model (Mod.) identity.
C
o
lo
u
r
o
n
li
n
e
,
B
&
W
in
p
ri
n
t
L
O
W
R
E
S
O
L
U
T
IO
N
F
IG
J. Sweetman, L. E. Whitmarsh / Topics in Cognitive Science (2015) 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
able energy technology, energy efficiency projects, environmental management ser-
vices) that are vital to tackling climate change.
In the low status condition, the model employed was homeless people paying 15% of
their earnings through a scheme initiated by “The Big Issue UK (a street newspaper sold
by homeless individuals in Britain).” In the outgroup condition, the high status (US
chamber of commerce) and low status (The Big Issue USA) models were American.
After participants read about the model’s actions, they completed manipulation checks
and, then, the measures of interest.
4.1.2. Measures1
4.1.2.1. Manipulation checks: To test the validity of our manipulation, we checked the
perceived status of the model by asking participants to rate the status of the group taking
action on a scale from 1 (low status) to 3 (high status). Participants were also asked to
report the nationality of the group taking action.
4.1.2.2. Moral judgments: Participants rated each of the 14 personal and political actions
listed below (a = 0.71 and 0.86, for personal and political behaviors, respectively) as to,
“how fair it would be for you to take each one” on a scale from 1 (not at all fair) to 7
(extremely fair).
4.1.2.3. Pro-environmental social identity: Participants rated each of the 14 actions
(a = 0.71 and 0.73, for personal and political behaviors, respectively) as to: “how ‘Bri-
tish’ (i.e., characteristic of British people) you consider each one to be” on a scale from
1 (not at all British) to 7 (extremely British).
4.1.2.4. Collective efficacy: Participants rated each action (a = 0.85 and 0.88, for per-
sonal and political behaviors, respectively) as to: “how able British people are in general
to perform each action” on a scale from 1 (not at all able) to 7 (extremely able).
4.1.2.5. Personal pro-environmental action: Participants rated how willing they were to
undertake nine behaviors (a = 0.67) taken from Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010) 3—“turn off
lights you’re not using,” “drive economically,” “walk, cycle or take public transport for
short journeys,” “use an alternative to travelling,” “cut down on the amount you fly,” “eat
food which is locally grown or in season,” “avoid eating meat,” “recycle,” “turn off the tap
when you brush your teeth”—on a scale from 1 (not at all willing) to 7 (very willing).
4.1.2.6. Political pro-environmental action: The political action items were derived from
Van Zomeren et al. (2004): “write to your MP about climate change,” “take part in a pro-
test about climate change,” “donate money to a campaign group on climate change,” “do
something together with fellow students to address climate change,” and “join a campaign
group to tackle climate change” (a = 0.90). Again, participants rated these behaviors on a
scale from 1 (not at all willing) to 7 (very willing).
6 J. Sweetman, L. E. Whitmarsh / Topics in Cognitive Science (2015)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
4.2. Results and discussion
4.2.1. Manipulation checks
There was a significant association between the manipulation of model status and the
perceived status of the model, v2(2) = 57.76, p < .001. As expected, a greater than chance
proportion of those in the high status model condition perceived the model as having high
status (57% vs. 0% for perceived low status), z = 3.40, p < .001. Similarly, a greater than
chance proportion of those who saw the low status model perceived the model as having
low status (56% vs. 9% for perceived high status), z = 4.10, p < .001. The reported
nationality of the model was contingent on model identity, v2(2) = 75.29, p < .001. As
expected, a greater than chance proportion (79%) of those in the model outgroup (Ameri-
can) condition perceived the model as American (vs. 13% and 8% who reported that the
model was British or that they did not know, respectively), z = 4.80, p < .001. Likewise,
a greater than chance proportion (75%) of those in the model ingroup (British) condition
perceived the model as British (vs. 5% and 20% who reported that the model was Ameri-
can or that they did not know, respectively), z = 3.62, p < .001. Taken together, these
findings suggest that we were successful in manipulating the perceived status and group
identity of the social model.
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous variables
in the models are reported in Table 1. As predicted, with the exception of the association
between pro-environmental identity and political action, all the mediators are significantly
and positively associated with the willingness to perform the corresponding (personal vs.
political) pro-environmental behavior (rs > .2, ps < .05).
4.2.2. Moderated mediation analysis
Using the PROCESS for SPSS macro (Hayes, 2013), we estimated the conditional
indirect effect of model social status on willingness to take personal and political pro-
environmental action through our measures of efficacy, fairness, and pro-environmental
identity:
Table 1
Correlations among and descriptive statistics for key study variables (experiment 1)
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Efficacy(personal) 5.93 (0.89) 0.47*** 0.161 0.45*** 0.77*** 0.24** 0.28** 0.17
2. Fairness(personal) 5.73 (0.69) 0.067 0.68*** 0.37*** 0.50*** 0.07 0.32***
3. Identity(personal) 4.09 (0.80) 0.25** 0.15 !0.037 0.51*** 0.11
4. Behavior(personal) 5.55 (.73) 0.37*** 0.44*** 0.18* 0.47***
5. Efficacy(political) 5.37 (1.29) 0.27** 0.37*** 0.20*
6. Fairness(political) 4.58 (1.23) 0.12 0.51***
7. Identity(political) 4.03 (1.07) 0.10
8. Behavior(political) 2.97 (1.37)
Notes. *p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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M1ðefficacyÞ ¼
iM1ðconstantÞ þ a1X1ðmodel statusÞ þ a2X2ðmodel identityÞ þ a3X1X2 þ
eM1 ð1Þ
M2ðfairnessÞ ¼
iM2ðconstantÞ þ a4X1ðmodel statusÞ þ a5X2ðmodel identityÞ þ a6X1X2 þ
eM2 ð2Þ
M3ðpro!environmental identityÞ ¼
iM3ðconstantÞ þ a7X1ðmodel statusÞ þ a8X2ðmodel identityÞ
þ a9X1X2 þ
eM3
ð3Þ
Yðpro!environmental actionÞ ¼
iYðconstantÞ þ c
0
1X1ðmodel statusÞ þ c
0
2X2ðmodel identityÞ þ c
0
3X1X2
þ b1M1ðefficacyÞ þ b2M2ðfairnessÞ þ b3M3ðpro!environmental identityÞ
þ ey
ð4Þ
where iM and iY are intercept or constant terms and eM and ey are regression residuals.
The coefficients a1,2,4,5,7,8 and b1-3 are then used to assess the presence of the indirect
effects of X1(model status) and X2(model identity) on Y(pro-environmental action) via M1(efficacy),
M2(fairness), and M3(pro-environmental identity). The indirect effect of X1 is conditional on X2 to
the extent that the interaction coefficients a3,6,9 depart from zero. Coefficient c
0
1 and c
0
2
represent the direct effects of X1 and X2 with the direct effect of X1 being conditional on
X2 to the extent that the interaction coefficient c
0
3 departs from zero. The coefficients in
Equations (1–4) were estimated using ordinary least-squares regression and represent a
full test of our conceptual model (see Fig. 1).
4.2.2.1. Personal pro-environmental action: As can be seen in Table 2 (Top) being
exposed to a high (vs. low) status model decreased the extent to which British people
were seen to possess the efficacy to carry out personal pro-environmental actions, and
decreased judgments of the fairness of such actions. Put differently, we find evidence for
the notion that the actions of low (vs. high) status models aimed at tackling climate
change can serve to increase perceptions of collective efficacy and make it seem fairer to
undertake action oneself. Model status was not significantly associated with perceptions
of pro-environmental British identity. It seems that the high status of a social model is
not, by itself, enough to shape group norms. We speculate that businesspersons might not
be perceived as legitimate societal leaders and as such our high status model may not eli-
cit the kind of leadership processes that can influence the content and norms associated
with collective identity (Hogg, 2001). However, as predicted, measures of pro-environ-
mental British identity, fairness, and efficacy were all positively associated with willing-
ness to perform personal pro-environmental behavior. Contrary to group accounts of
social influence (e.g., Turner, 1991), the model’s group identity was not associated with
any of the mediators and the direct effects of social model identity and status were not
statistically significant.
As indicated by the interaction term (X1 9 X2) in Table 2, model group identity did
not significantly moderate the effect of model status on any of the mediators. Further-
more, there was no evidence that the direct effect of model status was moderated by the
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group membership of the model. This is evidence that the effect of model status on
willingness to take personal pro-environmental action is not moderated by the group
membership of the model. However, it is possible that an indirect effect may be moder-
ated in the absence of evidence that a particular path is moderated (see Hayes, 2013). In
order to conduct a formal test of whether indirect effects were moderated, we used PRO-
CESS for SPSS macro with 5,000 bootstrap samples to estimate the conditional indirect
effect of model status on willingness to take pro-environmental action through our media-
tors. For example, the conditional indirect of model status through moral judgments of
fairness is quantified as (a1 + a4 X2) b2 where a1 is the path model status ? fairness, a4
is the path model status*model group identity ? fairness, X2 is model group identity,
and b2 is the path fairness ? willingness to take pro-environmental action.
A bias-corrected bootstrap-confidence interval (CI) revealed a significant negative indi-
rect effect of model social status on willingness to perform personal pro-environmental
action through moral judgments of the fairness of the actions (point estimate = !0.27,
95% percentile CI !0.51 to !0.06) in the outgroup, but not in the ingroup condition (point
estimate = !0.11, 95% percentile CI !0.35 to 0.09). In other words, being exposed to a
low (vs. high) status model increases the willingness to take personal pro-environmental
action through increasing the perceived fairness of taking such action. But contrary to the
group influence account, this indirect effect is only statistically significant when partici-
pants are presented with an outgroup (vs. ingroup) model. However, a bootstrap CI for the
difference between conditional indirect effects, quantified as a4b2(X2(ingroup) ! X2(outgroup)),
was not significant (point estimate = 0.15, 95% percentile CI !0.13 to 0.48). This means
that the indirect effects of status through judgments of fairness do not differ statistically as
a function of the model’s group membership. The indirect effects of model status through
perceptions of efficacy (point estimates = !0.08, 95% percentile CI !0.25 to 0.01 and
!0.02, 95% percentile CI !0.14 to 0.02, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respec-
tively) and pro-environmental identity (point estimates = !0.02, 95% percentile CI !0.12
to 0.04 and !0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.08 to 0.06 in the outgroup and ingroup condi-
tions, respectively) were also not statistically significant.
The indirect effects of model identity through judgments of fairness (point esti-
mates = !0.06, 95% percentile CI !0.28 to 0.14 and 0.09, 95% percentile CI !0.13 to
0.33, for low and high status conditions, respectively), perceptions of efficacy (point esti-
mates = !0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.10 to 0.03 and 0.04, 95% percentile CI !0.01 to
0.20, for low and high status conditions, respectively), and perceived pro-environmental
identity (point estimates = !0.02, 95% percentile CI !0.12 to 0.04 and !0.01, 95% per-
centile CI !0.08 to 0.07, for low and high status conditions, respectively) were also not
statistically significant.
Our analyses suggest that judgments of the fairness and efficacy of pro-environmental
actions and the degree to which they are reflective of collective identity are all unique
predictors of the willingness to engage in pro-environmental action. Contrary to the
group-basis of influence account we find some limited evidence that outgroup social mod-
els with low (vs. high) status may increase willingness to take pro-environmental action
through making such action seem fairer.
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4.2.2.2. Political pro-environmental action: As can be seen in Table 2 (Bottom), once
again being exposed to a high (vs. low) status model decreased perceptions of possessing
the collective efficacy to carry out pro-environmental actions. Model status was not sig-
nificantly associated with judgments of pro-environmental social identity or the fairness
of political actions. In contrast to personal actions, measures of pro-environmental social
identity and collective efficacy did not predict willingness to take political action. How-
ever, moral judgments of the fairness of political action did predict political action ten-
dencies. Again, we found no association between the model’s group identity and any of
our mediators and the direct effects of group identity and social model status were not
statistically significant.
Once again, the model group identity did not significantly moderate the effect of model
status on any of the mediators and there was no evidence that the direct effect of model
status was moderated by the group membership. A bias-corrected bootstrap-confidence
interval revealed that the indirect effects of model status through moral judgments of fair-
ness (point estimates = !0.27, 95% percentile CI !0.66 to 0.05 and 0.00, 95% percentile
CI !0.34 to 0.33, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively), perceptions of
efficacy (point estimates = !0.06, 95% percentile CI !0.26 to 0.09 and !0.01, 95% per-
centile CI !0.16 to 0.03, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively), and pro-
environmental identity (point estimates = !0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.10 to 0.04 and
!0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.13 to 0.04 in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respec-
tively) were not statistically significant.
The indirect effects of model identity through judgments of fairness (point esti-
mates = !0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.36 to 0.27 and 0.24, 95% percentile CI !0.10 to
0.63, for low and high status conditions, respectively), perceptions of efficacy (point esti-
mate = !0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.14 to 0.04 and 0.04, 95% percentile CI !0.04 to
0.23, for low and high status conditions, respectively), and perceived pro-environmental
identity (point estimate = !0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.09 to 0.04 and !0.00, 95% per-
centile CI !0.11 to 0.04, for low and high status conditions, respectively) were also not
statistically significant.
4.2.2.3. Additional analyses2: Due to the high number (23%) of participants who did not
report the correct group membership of the social model we carried out the above analy-
ses with only those that gave a correct response. Results for personal action no longer
revealed a significant indirect effect of model status through moral judgments of fairness
(point estimates = !0.16, 95% percentile CI !0.40 to 0.07 and !0.14, 95% percentile CI
!0.41 to 0.07, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively). High (vs. low) sta-
tus model was still associated with a decrease in perceived collective efficacy,
b = !0.40, t(94) = !2.16, p = .03. However, perceptions of collective efficacy no longer
uniquely predicted personal action tendencies, b = 0.07, t(91) = 1.22, p = .22. High (vs.
low) status model was now only marginally associated with a decrease in fairness judg-
ments, b = !0.23, t(94) = !1.71, p = .09. However, moral judgments and pro-environ-
mental social identity continued to uniquely predict personal action tendencies, b = 0.66,
t(91) = 8.09, p < .001 and b = 0.15, t(91) = 2.53, p = .013, respectively. There were no
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other significant effects in this new model. The results for political action did not change
with a high (vs. low) status model still being associated with a decrease in perceived col-
lective efficacy, b = !0.56, t(94) = !2.16, p = .03. And moral judgments of fairness
continued to uniquely predict willingness to take political action, b = 0.53, t(91) = 5.26,
p < .001. These additional analyses cast some doubt on the robustness of our indirect
effect of model status through moral judgments.
4.3. Experiment 2: Testing for a conditional indirect effect of model status in a
non-student sample
The results of Experiment 1 strongly indicate that moral judgments of an action’s
fairness are an important predictor of willingness to take pro-environmental action. The
results of our additional analyses cast some doubt on the potential for the status and
group membership of social models to influence pro-environmental action through
moral judgments, perceptions of efficacy, and pro-environmental social identity. There-
fore, we aimed to replicate our initial findings in a larger, non-student sample. This
allows us to address the limited statistical power in Experiment 1 (see Fritz &
MacKinnon, 2007), which is of particular concern when considering the results of our
additional analyses. Further, it allows us to explore whether similar effects occur in a
more representative, non-student sample (see Sears, 1986; but see Anderson, Lindsay,
& Bushman, 1999).
4.3.1. Participants, design, and procedure
Participants were 333 American citizens (212 women and 117 men; age: M = 32.10,
SD = 11.53; 60% possessed a college degree) who were recruited from an online crowd-
sourcing platform and received $1.82 for their participation (US minimum wage for a
10–15 min study). We employed the same design and procedure as in Experiment 1.
4.3.2. Measures
We employed the same measures as in Experiment 1 with three differences. First, we
changed relevant items and corresponding anchors from “British” to “American.” Second,
we changed two of the political action items: “write to your [MP] Representative or
Senator about climate change” and “do something together with [fellow students] others
to address climate change.” In addition, we checked the social model’s perceived status
by asking participants to rate the status of the group taking action on a scale from 1 (very
high status) to 7 (very low high status). We reverse coded these items for ease of inter-
pretation.
Our measures of moral judgments of the fairness of action (a = 0.90 and 0.92, for per-
sonal and political action, respectively), collective efficacy (a = 0.93 and 0.93, for per-
sonal and political action, respectively), pro-environmental social identity (a = 0.92 and
0.91, for personal and political action, respectively), and willingness to take pro-environ-
mental action (a = 0.88 and 0.94, for personal and political action, respectively) all
showed excellent reliability.
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4.4. Results and discussion
4.4.1. Manipulation checks
An ANOVA with model identity and status as between-subjects factors and perceived
model status as the dependent variable revealed participants in the high status condition
(M = 4.65, SD = 1.19) saw the social model as higher in status than their counterparts in
the low status condition (M = 3.08, SD = 2.42), F(1, 329) = 56.29, p < .001, g2p = 0.15.
Unexpectedly, there was a statistically significant effect of social model group member-
ship on perceptions of status with participants rating the British (outgroup) models as
higher in status (M = 4.08, SD = 2.09) than their American (ingroup) counterparts
(M = 3.64, SD = 2.03), although the magnitude of this effect was extremely small, F(1,
329) = 4.25, p = .04, g2p = 0.01. The reported nationality of the model was contingent on
model identity, v2(2) = 289.37, p < .001. As expected, a greater than chance proportion
(93%) of those in the model ingroup condition perceived the model as American (vs. 2%
and 5% who reported that the model was British or that they did not know, respectively),
z = 8.29, p < .001. Likewise, a greater than chance proportion (95%) of those in the
model outgroup condition perceived the model as British (vs. 3% and 2% who reported
that the model was American or that they didn’t know, respectively), z = 8.65, p < .001.
Taken together, these findings suggest that we were successful in manipulating the per-
ceived status and group identity of the social model.
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous variables
in the models are reported in Table 3. As predicted, all the mediators are significantly
and positively associated with the willingness to perform the corresponding (personal vs.
political) pro-environmental behavior (rs > .26, ps < .001).
4.4.2. Moderated mediation analysis
Again, we estimated our conceptual model (see Fig. 1) using ordinary least-squares
regression.
Table 3
Correlations among and descriptive statistics for key study variables (experiment 2)
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Efficacy(personal) 5.37 (1.31) 0.47*** 0.25*** 0.57*** 0.88*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.28***
2. Fairness(personal) 5.56 (1.24) 0.28*** 0.72*** 0.48*** 0.75*** 0.37*** 0.37***
3. Identity(personal) 4.08 (1.26) 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.69*** 0.28***
4. Behavior(personal) 5.32 (1.26) 0.52*** 0.58*** 0.41*** 0.56***
5. Efficacy(political) 5.32 (1.44) 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.35***
6. Fairness(political) 5.14 (1.59) 0.42*** 0.54***
7. Identity(political) 4.68 (1.35) 0.27***
8. Behavior(political) 3.79 (1.91)
Notes. *p < .05.
**p < .01. 9
***p < .001.
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4.4.2.1. Personal pro-environmental action: In contrast to our initial analyses of
Experiment 1 model status did not have any significant association with perceptions of
collective efficacy or moral judgments of fairness (see Table 4, Top). Indeed, neither
model status nor group membership was statistically associated with any of our media-
tors. However, in keeping with the initial results of Experiment 1 our measures of fair-
ness, perceived collective efficacy, and pro-environmental identity all uniquely predicted
personal action tendencies. Again, the direct effects of group identity and social model
status were not statistically significant and model group identity did not significantly
moderate the effect of model status on any of the mediators. In addition, the direct effect
of model status was not moderated by the group membership of the model.
A bias-corrected bootstrap-CI revealed a significant positive indirect effect of model
status on willingness to perform personal pro-environmental action through perceptions of
collective efficacy (point estimate = 0.09, 95% percentile CI 0.01 to 0.24) in the outgroup
but not in the ingroup condition (point estimate = !0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.11 to
0.11). That is, being exposed to a high (vs. low) status model increases willingness
to take personal action through increasing the perceived collective efficacy of the ingroup
to take action. But contrary to the group influence account, this indirect effect is only sta-
tistically significant when participants are presented with an outgroup (vs. ingroup)
model. However, a bootstrap CI for the difference between conditional indirect effects
was not significant (point estimate = !0.10, 95% percentile CI !0.29 to 0.03). This
means that the conditional indirect effects of status through judgments of efficacy do not
differ statistically as a function of the model’s group membership.
Unlike the initial analyses of Experiment 1, the indirect effects of model status through
moral judgments of fairness (point estimates = !0.04, 95% percentile CI !0.27 to 0.17
and 0.13, 95% percentile CI !0.07 to 0.35, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions,
respectively) were not statistically significant. Indirect effects of status through pro-envir-
onmental identity (point estimates = !0.02, 95% percentile CI !0.08 to 0.02 and 0.01,
95% percentile CI !0.03 to 0.07 in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively)
were also not statistically significant.
The indirect effect of model identity through judgments of fairness was significant and
positive (point estimate = 0.20, 95% percentile CI 0.01 to 0.44) in the high but not in the
low status condition (point estimate = !0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.21 to 0.27). Put sim-
ply, having an ingroup (vs. outgroup) model of high status increased action tendencies
through making engaging in action seem fairer. However, a bootstrap CI for the differ-
ence between conditional indirect effects was not significant (point estimate = !0.17,
95% percentile CI !0.14 to 0.50). There was also a significant positive indirect effect of
model identity through perceptions of collective efficacy (point estimate = 0.11, 95% per-
centile CI 0.01 to 0.27) in the low but not in the high status condition (point esti-
mate = 0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.08 to 0.14). This suggests that having an ingroup (vs.
outgroup) model of low status increased action tendencies through making increasing per-
ceptions of collective efficacy. However, once again, a bootstrap CI for the difference
between conditional indirect effects was not significant (point estimate = !0.10, 95%
percentile CI !0.29 to 0.03). Finally, neither of the indirect effects of model identity
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through perceived pro-environmental identity (point estimates = 0.00, 95% percentile CI
!0.04 to 0.06 and 0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.005 to 0.10, for low and high status condi-
tions, respectively) were statistically significant.
4.4.2.2. Political pro-environmental action: As can be seen in Table 4 (Bottom), viewing
an ingroup (vs. outgroup) model increased perceptions of the collective efficacy to carry
out pro-environmental actions, the extent to which such actions were seen as characteris-
tic of Americans, and (marginally) the fairness of such actions. These results offer sup-
port for the group influence account and extend the positive effects of ingroup action
beyond perceptions of collective efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In keeping with
our findings for personal action in both the current study and Experiment 1, we find that
perceptions of collective efficacy and moral judgments of the fairness of engaging in
action predict action tendencies. However, pro-environmental social identity did not
uniquely predict action tendencies. Again, the direct effects of group identity and social
model status were not statistically significant.
In support of our conditional process account in Fig. 1, the effects of the model’s group
membership on judgments of fairness and pro-environmental social identity were moderated
by model status. A bias-corrected bootstrap-confidence interval revealed a positive indirect
effect of model status through moral judgments of fairness (point estimate = 0.34, 95% per-
centile CI 0.10 to 0.64) in the ingroup but not the outgroup condition (point esti-
mate = !0.12, 95% percentile CI !0.41 to 0.16). In other words, high status social models
increase political pro-environmental action through making engaging in such actions seem
more moral, but only when the social model was an ingroup member. A bootstrap CI for
the difference between conditional indirect effects was significant (point estimate = 0.45,
95% percentile CI 0.09 to .90). This is evidence for our conceptual model and for the idea
we may use ingroup bias and tendencies to be influenced by high status models in order to
engender pro-environmental action(see Markowitz & Shariff, 2012)
The indirect effects of model status through perceptions of efficacy (point estimates =
.08, 95% percentile CI !0.00 to 0.21 and 0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.10 to 0.09, for out-
group and ingroup conditions, respectively) and perceived pro-environmental identity (point
estimates = !0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.09 to 0.04 and !0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.05
to 0.11, for outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively) were not statistically significant.
In addition, the indirect effect of model identity through perceptions of efficacy (point
estimate = 0.10, 95% percentile CI 0.01 to 0.29) was significant for low but not high status
models (0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.04 to 0.16, for low and high status conditions, respec-
tively). However, a bootstrap CI for the difference between conditional indirect effects was
not significant (point estimate = !0.07, 95% percentile CI !0.26 to 0.04). Finally, the
indirect effects of model identity through perceived pro-environmental identity (point esti-
mates = !0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.04 to 0.04 and 0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.09 to
0.13, for low and high status conditions, respectively) were not statistically significant.
We found evidence that high (vs. low) status social models increase political pro-envir-
onmental action through making engaging in such actions seem fairer, but only when the
social model is an ingroup member. This is in line with group influence accounts that
16 J. Sweetman, L. E. Whitmarsh / Topics in Cognitive Science (2015)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
suggest ingroup membership is an important facilitator of social influence (Abrams et al.,
1990; e.g., Turner, 1991).
4.5. Experiment 3: Testing for a conditional indirect effect of model status in a student
sample with a more meaningful ingroup membership
The results of Experiment 2 offer some support for our conceptual model. However,
they are somewhat inconsistent with those of Experiment 1. We reasoned that the fail-
ure to support our conceptual model may be due to the limited statistical power in
Experiment 1, the quality of data, and/or properties of student samples (see Sears,
1986). Related to the latter, we reasoned that a failure to support the group influence
account might be due to the ingroup membership not being salient or meaningful
enough in Experiment 1. Therefore, we carried out another replication but this time
employed a more meaningful and salient ingroup membership for a student sample:
student identity.
4.5.1. Participants, design, and procedure
Participants were 229 British students (205 women and 22 men; age: M = 19.48,
SD = 4.45) who participated for course credit. We employed the same design and proce-
dure as in Experiment 1 with one key difference. We employed the CBI and Big Issue
UK social models as in Experiment 1 but this time participants in the high status (stu-
dent) ingroup condition read that:
Recently Oxford University’s Student Union has introduced a climate change scheme
whereby the Union will pay 15% of its annual funding to the Oxford University action
on climate change project. The project has received broad support from Oxford stu-
dents. Importantly, this project invests in developing technologies and services (e.g.,
renewable energy technology, energy efficiency projects, environmental management
services) that are vital to tackling climate change, and moves away (divests funds)
from fossil fuels.
In the low status (student) ingroup condition, the social model employed was students
from the University of Brighton, a relatively lower status British university.
4.5.2. Measures
We employed the same measures as in Experiment 1. Our measures of moral judg-
ments of the fairness of action (a = 0.67 and 0.84, for personal and political action,
respectively), collective efficacy (a = 0.79 and 0.84, for personal and political action,
respectively), pro-environmental social identity (a = 0.87 and 0.85, for personal and
political action, respectively), and willingness to take pro-environmental action
(a = 0.68 and 0.88, for personal and political action, respectively) all showed adequate
reliability.
J. Sweetman, L. E. Whitmarsh / Topics in Cognitive Science (2015) 17
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
4.6. Results and discussion
4.6.1. Manipulation checks
Participants in the high status condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.22) saw the social model as
higher in status than those in the low status condition (M = 4.16, SD = 1.73),
F(1, 222) = 5.63, p = .02, g2p = 0.03. There was no statistically significant effect of social
model group membership on perceptions of status, F(1, 222) = 1.70, p = .19, g2p = 0.01.
However, there was an unexpected interaction between model status and group membership,
F(1, 222) = 4.75, p = .03, g2p = 0.02. Analyses revealed that the simple main effect of
model status was only significant in the ingroup (student) condition, F(1, 222) = 10.33,
p = .001, g2p = 0.05; participants in the ingroup high status model condition (M = 4.97,
SD = 1.01) rated the status of the model as higher than their counterparts in the low status
condition (M = 4.07, SD = 1.15). In contrast, those in the outgroup high status condition
(M = 4.28, SD = 1.32) did not differ from their counterparts in the low status condition
(M = 4.25, SD = 2.17), F(1, 222) = 0.02, p = .89, g2p = 0.000. These findings suggest that
on average we were successful in manipulating model status. However, it seems that this
effect is driven by the perceived status difference between the student ingroup models. One
explanation may be that British students are particularly unwilling to report the low status of
homeless people (or the high status of business executives). This is in deep contrast to our
non-student American sample and other representative American samples who have been
shown to engage in extreme stereotyping of the homeless (Fiske et al., 2007). This may also
shed light on the inconsistencies in social model effects across Experiment 1 and 2.
The reported group membership of the model was contingent on model identity,
v
2
(2) = 166.15, p < .001. As expected, a greater than chance proportion (79%) of those in
the model ingroup condition perceived the model as student (vs. 4% and 17% who
reported that the model was not a student/student body or that they did not know, respec-
tively), z = 6.69, p < .001. Likewise, a greater than chance proportion (80%) of those in
the model outgroup (CEO and Big Issue) condition perceived the model correctly (vs.
2% and 18% who reported that the model was a student or that they did not know,
respectively), z = 6.15, p < .001. These findings suggest that we were successful in
manipulating the perceived group identity of the social model.
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous variables
in the models are reported in Table 5. As predicted, all the mediators are significantly
and positively associated with the willingness to perform the corresponding (personal vs.
political) pro-environmental behavior (rs > .22, ps < .05).
4.6.2. Moderated mediation analysis
Again, we estimated our conceptual model (see Fig. 1) using ordinary least-squares
regression.
4.6.2.1. Personal pro-environmental action: As in Experiment 2, model status did not
have any significant association with perceptions of collective efficacy or moral judg-
ments of fairness (see Table 6, Top). Again, neither model status nor group membership
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was statistically associated with any of our mediators. However, in keeping with the
results of Experiment 1 and 2 our measures of fairness, perceived collective efficacy, and
pro-environmental identity (marginally) all uniquely predicted personal action tendencies.
In support of our conditional process account (see Fig. 1), and the political action find-
ings from Experiment 2, the effects of the model’s group membership on judgments of
fairness were moderated by model status. Once again, a bias-corrected bootstrap-confi-
dence interval revealed a positive indirect effect of model status through moral judgments
of fairness (point estimate = 0.11, 95% percentile CI 0.002 to 0.25) in the ingroup but
not the outgroup condition (point estimate = !0.05, 95% percentile CI !0.19 to 0.07).
As for political action in Experiment 2, high status social models increased pro-environ-
mental action tendencies through making engaging in such actions seem fairer, but only
when the social model was an ingroup member. A bootstrap CI for the difference
between conditional indirect effects was significant (point estimate = 0.17, 95% percentile
CI 0.004 to 0.37). This is evidence for our conceptual model that proposes the conditional
indirect effects of model status on pro-environmental action. Model group identity did
not significantly moderate the effect of model status on any of the mediators.
Again, the direct effects of group identity and social model status were not statistically
significant. However, this time the direct effect of model status was moderated by the
group membership of the model. Examination of the conditional direct effects indicated
that the effect of model status was significant in the ingroup (b = 0.25, t(217) = 2.31,
p = .02), but not outgroup condition (b = !0.06, t(217) = !0.52, p = .60). That is, high
(vs. low) status social models increased pro-environmental action tendencies directly, but
only when the social model is an ingroup member.
Unlike Experiment 2 bias-corrected bootstrap-CI revealed no significant positive indi-
rect effect of model status through perceptions of collective efficacy (point esti-
mates = 0.05, 95% percentile CI !0.03 to 0.14 and 0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.05 to
0.12, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively) and pro-environmental identity
(point estimates = 0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.02 to 0.04 and !0.01, 95% percentile CI
!0.06 to 0.01, in the outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively).
Table 5
Correlations among and descriptive statistics for key study variables (experiment 3)
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Efficacy(personal) 5.62 (0.80) 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.23*** !0.15* 0.07
2. Fairness(personal) 5.67 (0.67) 0.14* 0.56*** 0.34*** 0.59*** !0.01 0.30***
3. Identity(personal) 4.50 (1.14) 0.22* 0.18** 0.09 0.19** 0.21**
4. Behavior(personal) 5.66 (0.74) 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.00 0.36***
5. Efficacy(political) 4.45 (1.17) 0.46*** 0.19** 0.44***
6. Fairness(political) 4.82 (1.13) 0.18** 0.58***
7. Identity(political) 3.49 (1.28) 0.33***
8. Behavior(political) 3.40 (1.40)
Notes. *p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
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The indirect effects of model identity through judgments of fairness (point
estimates = !0.09, 95% percentile CI !0.23 to 0.04 and 0.08, 95% percentile CI !0.03
to 0.22, for low and high status conditions, respectively), perceptions of efficacy (point
estimates = 0.05, 95% percentile CI !0.02 to 0.15 and 0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.04 to
0.13, for low and high status conditions, respectively), and perceived pro-environmental
identity (point estimates = !0.00, 95% percentile CI !0.03 to 0.02 and !0.01, 95% per-
centile CI !0.07 to 0.00, for low and high status conditions, respectively) were also not
statistically significant.
4.6.2.2. Political pro-environmental action: As can be seen in Table 6 (Bottom), neither
model status, group membership, nor their interaction term were statistically associated
with our mediators. Again, the direct effects of social model identity and status were not
statistically significant. And the direct effect of model status was not moderated by model
group membership. However, once again, our measures of fairness, perceived collective
efficacy, and pro-environmental identity all uniquely predicted political action tendencies.
The indirect effects of model status through moral judgments of fairness (point esti-
mates = !0.09, 95% percentile CI !0.35 to 0.16 and 0.07, 95% percentile CI !0.15 to
0.29, for outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively), perceptions of efficacy (point
estimates = 0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.06 to 0.14 and 0.07, 95% percentile CI !0.01 to
0.22, for outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively), and perceived pro-environmental
identity (point estimates = 0.03, 95% percentile CI !0.07 to 0.16 and !0.00, 95% per-
centile CI !0.13 to 0.13, for outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively) were not sta-
tistically significant.
In addition, the indirect effects of model group identity through moral judgments of
fairness (point estimates = !0.06, 95% percentile CI !0.29 to 0.18 and 0.10, 95% per-
centile CI !0.14 to 0.34, for outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively), perceptions
of efficacy (point estimates = 0.01, 95% percentile CI !0.09 to 0.12 and 0.05, 95% per-
centile CI !0.03 to 0.20, for outgroup and ingroup conditions, respectively), and per-
ceived pro-environmental identity (point estimates = !0.02, 95% percentile CI !0.15 to
0.11 and !0.05, 95% percentile CI !0.18 to 0.05, for outgroup and ingroup conditions,
respectively) were also not statistically significant.
Our findings offer some further support for our conceptual model. Once again, we find
that high (vs. low) status models engender pro-environmental action, albeit personal this
time, through making such actions seem morally more just; but only when the model
shares a meaningful ingroup membership. Indeed, we find evidence that this group-condi-
tional influence of high status may also have a direct impact on action tendencies.
5. General discussion
Recent work has suggested that aspects of our social and moral cognition may be a
significant barrier to engendering actions to tackle climate change (e.g., Markowitz &
Shariff, 2012). Here we report evidence that through group-based social influence
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(Abrams et al., 1990; Turner, 1991), and our moral sense of justice, it may be possible to
employ these characteristics of the human mind to engender pro-environmental action
(see also Feinberg & Willer, 2013). Building on the efficacy of social modeling
approaches to engender pro-environmental behavior change (see Osbaldiston & Schott,
2012) we find evidence that high (vs. low) status models increase pro-environmental
action, in part, through making such actions seem morally fairer to undertake. We find
some evidence that this effect of high status models only occurs when they share a mean-
ingful ingroup membership with the target of influence. Further, we find evidence that
this group-based conditional influence of high status models may also have a direct
impact on action tendencies. While the exact behaviors that are influenced may vary
across student and non-student samples (see Sears, 1986), a focus on the “justice path-
way” to action and the social-cognitive features of social models may offer a good oppor-
tunity for cognitive and behavioral scientists to integrate insights from basic research
with those stemming from less controlled, applied efforts (see Osbaldiston & Schott,
2012).
We found that moral judgments of the fairness of pro-environmental action were con-
sistently the strongest predictor of willingness to engage in such action. While this predic-
tive power is impressive in itself and adds more specificity to work that has shown more
general environmental moral norms to be an important predictor of pro-environmental
action (for a review, see Bamberg & M€oser, 2007), perhaps most exciting is the respon-
siveness of this moral pathway to the actions of high status members of one’s ingroup. In
general, this finding is in keeping with approaches that suggest moral judgments and
norms are to some significant degree shaped by social influence processes (Darley, 1990;
e.g., Haidt, 2001) and that those with high status (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001;
Markowitz & Shariff, 2012; Sweetman et al., 2013) and ingroup membership (Abrams
et al., 1990; e.g., Turner, 1991) possess greater powers of social influence. Moreover, it
points toward ways in which those with power and status may influence behavior through
the development of “moral leadership” (see Fehr et al., 2015; Van Zant & Moore, 2015).
Beyond simply framing climate change messages to appeal to moral values (Feinberg
& Willer, 2013; Markowitz & Shariff, 2012) our findings go to the heart of deeper moral
notions associate with “climate justice.” In particular, our findings concern notions of cli-
mate justice within, rather than between, societies and groups. That is, our results suggest
that those with power and status are in a particularly opportune position within societies
and groups. On the one hand, their greater agency, influence, and resources mean they
are able to have a greater impact on tackling climate change. At the same time, their high
status also seems to convey on them a special role for shaping moral norms (see Keltner,
Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). While it is easy to use the classic problems of collec-
tive action as a reason for inaction, our data suggests that, rather than free-riding, people
may respond to the pro-environmental actions of high status members of their group by
increasing their commitment to the cause, feeling that it is only fair that they should act.
In contrast, if those with power and status do nothing to tackle climate change, it is easy
to see how our data might suggest that people would be less willing to take action, per-
ceiving such action as less moral just. In this sense our findings suggest that the moral
22 J. Sweetman, L. E. Whitmarsh / Topics in Cognitive Science (2015)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
domain of justice (see Haidt, 2007) may be an important driver of pro-environmental
action. Future work would do well to examine the impact of social influence processes
on how fair people perceive pro-environmental actions to be. Rather than focusing on the
problem (climate change) as moral or immoral our work suggests that a focus on the
moral fairness of necessary actions may be one effective way of recruiting our moral psy-
chology in order to tackle climate change.
Here we have taken the first few steps toward exploring the potential for social influ-
ence based on status and group membership to influence our pro-environmental action
though our moral judgments of fairness. However, the current research has various limita-
tions that should be considered when drawing any strong conclusions, particularly for the
purposes of informing current policy and action. It is possible that the absence of some
group-based influence effects may be due to a failure of the model identity manipulation
to provided an explicit enough inter-group comparison (see Abrams et al., 1990). That
said, the fact that we do find some direct, indirect, and conditional effects of group mem-
bership suggests that our paradigm was sufficient enough to trigger social categorization
and group-based influence processes. Future work would do well to manipulate the sal-
ience of inter-group comparisons to examine whether our effects are conditional on
degree of social identity salience (see Rabinovich et al., 2011). Although our results
demonstrate strong evidence for the predictive role of moral judgments of the fairness of
pro-environmental action across student, non-student, British, and American samples,
there is still some inconsistency across studies in terms of the specific behaviors that high
status ingroup members engender through the justice pathway. Future work would also
do well to explore possible differences between student and non-student samples as well
as cultural differences in responses to high status ingroup models. Furthermore, longitudi-
nal field-experimental designs could be employed in order to better understand the psy-
chological processes through which social models influence objective measures of pro-
environmental behavior. In contrast to the conventional techniques employed here for
testing mediation (see Hayes, 2013; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007), longitudinal
designs would offer the chance to use dynamic mediation approaches that involve testing
whether interventions leads to change in one outcome, which then predicts change in
another, providing a more direct test of the psychological processes involved (Coman,
Iordache, & Coman, 2013; see also Montoya & Hayes, n.d.).
Taken together, our findings suggest that although aspects of our social and moral cog-
nition may act as a barrier or, worse still, a “dragon on inaction” (Gifford, 2011) with
regard to climate change, they also provide an opportunity for us to employ what we
know about the structure of the human mind in pursuit of addressing one of the greatest
known risks to human and non-human life.
Notes
1. We also included measures of how costly and effective participants perceived the
model’s actions to be and various measures to tap positive and negative feelings
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toward the models. There were no main effects of model status, identity, or any
interaction effect on the perceived costliness (F(1, 123) = 1.59, p = .21, g2p = 0.01,
F(1, 123) = 1.18, p = .28, g2p = 0.01, and F(1, 123) = 1.13, p = .29, g
2
p = 0.01,
respectively) or effectiveness (F(1, 124) = 2.61, p = .11, g2p = 0.02, F(1, 124) =
1.15, p = .29, g2p = 0.009, and F(1, 124) = 0.50, p = .48, g
2
p = 0.004, respectively)
of the model’s action. Similarly, there were no main effects of model status,
identity, or any interaction effect with our evaluative measures toward the model,
F(1, 124) = 0.40, p = .53, g2p = 0.003, F(1, 124) = 0.51, p = .48, g
2
p = 0.004, and
F(1, 124) = 1.31, p = .25, g2p = 0.01, respectively. We also took measures of the
perceived costliness and effectiveness of each pro-environmental action. Adding
these additional measures to our statistical model made no significant difference to
the interpretation of our results.
2. We did not plan to exclude participations that failed to report the correct group
membership of the social model. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer who
suggested undertaking a separate analysis.
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